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Does Participating in a 401(k) Raise Your Lifetime Taxes? 
by Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Todd Neumann 
 
Contributing to 401(k)s and similar tax-deferred retirement accounts certainly lowers current 
taxes. But does it lower your lifetime taxes? If average and marginal tax rates were independent 
of income and didn’t change through time, the answer would be an unambiguous yes. The 
reduction in current taxes would exceed the increase in future taxes when measured in present 
value. But tax rates may be higher when retirement account withdrawals occur, either because 
one moves into higher marginal federal and state tax brackets or because the government raises 
tax rates. In addition, reducing tax brackets when young, at the price of higher tax brackets when 
old, may reduce the value of mortgage deductions. Finally, and very importantly, shifting taxable 
income from youth to old age can substantially increase the share of Social Security benefits 
subject to federal income taxation.  
This paper uses ESPlanner, a detailed, life-cycle personal financial planning model, to study the 
lifetime tax advantage gained by stylized young couples when they participate in a 401(k) plan. 
Assuming a 6 percent real return on assets, we find that low- and moderate-income households 
actually raise their lifetime taxes and lower their lifetime expenditures by saving in a 401(k) plan. 
In the case of a couple with $50,000 in annual earnings, partaking fully in the typical 401(k) plan 
raises lifetime tax payments by 1.1 percent and lowers lifetime expenditures by 0.4 percent. The 
lifetime tax hike is 6.4 percent and the lifetime spending reduction is 1.7 percent for such 
households if they receive an 8 percent real rate of return. These figures rise to 7.3 percent and 
2.3 percent, respectively, if taxes increase 20 percent after the couple retires. These findings are 
driven, in large part, by the additional taxation of Social Security benefits induced by 401(k) 
withdrawals.  
The picture is quite different for high-income young couples with so much income that 401(k) 
participation cannot a) lower and then raise their marginal income tax rates or b) raise the share of 
their Social Security benefits that is taxable. For such couples 401(k) participation means major 
lifetime tax savings. At a 6 percent real return, a couple earning $300,000 per year would enjoy a 
6.7 percent lifetime tax break, which translates into a 3.8 percent increase in lifetime spending. 
These couples continue to enjoy a large lifetime subsidy even if tax rates are raised by as much as 
a fifth when they retire.  
In addition to demonstrating the regressivity of the federal government’s tax-deferred saving 
policy, our findings call into question the taxation of Social Security benefits as well as the 
nondiscrimination rules that induce employers to encourage low earners to participate more in 
401(k) plans. They also suggest that low- and moderate-income households should consider 
contributing at lower rates and for shorter periods to their tax-deferred accounts. Finally, they 
indicate that saving through a Roth IRA affords much greater lifetime tax benefits than saving 
through either a 401(k) plan or a conventional IRA, assuming employers provide the same gross 




Does saving in 401(k) and similar tax-deferred retirement accounts really lower 
your lifetime taxes? If average and marginal tax rates were independent of income and 
didn’t change through time, the answer would be an unambiguous yes. But tax rates may 
be higher when withdrawals occur, either because one moves into a higher tax bracket or 
because the government raises tax rates. In addition, reducing tax brackets when young, 
at the price of higher tax brackets when old, may reduce the value of mortgage 
deductions, since these are primarily taken when young. Finally and very importantly, 
shifting taxable income from youth to old age can substantially increase the share of 
Social Security benefits subject to income taxation.  
Concerns that 401(k) participation may raise one’s lifetime taxes are, with one 
exception, inapplicable to those with high incomes. Such households are in high tax 
brackets and face the maximum degree of taxation on their Social Security benefits 
regardless of the extent of their tax-deferred saving. The exception is if tax rates are 
raised at the time these and other households withdraw their tax-favored savings.  
This paper studies the impact of participating in a 401(k) plan on lifetime taxes. It 
does so using Economic Security Planner (ESPlanner) – a life-cycle personal financial 
planning program that makes highly detailed federal income tax, state income tax, and 
Social Security benefit calculations.
1 The paper considers stylized young couples who, 
together with their employers, contribute the maximum amounts stipulated by typical 
401(k) plans. We measure the benefit from 401(k) participation in two ways – in terms of 
the percentage that lifetime taxes are reduced and in terms of the percentage that lifetime 
                                                           
1 ESPlanner was developed by Economic Security Planning, Inc.    1
spending is increased on account of the tax break.
2 We find that low- and middle-income 
households (those earning up to $50,000 per year) who earn a real pre-tax return of 6 
percent or more subject themselves to higher lifetime taxes by fully participating in the 
typical 401(k) plan.  
In the case of a young couple with $50,000 in initial annual earnings that earns a 6 
percent real return, partaking fully in the typical 401(k) plan raises lifetime tax payments 
by 1.1 percent and lowers lifetime expenditures by 0.4 percent. The lifetime tax hike is 
6.4 percent and the lifetime spending reduction is 1.7 percent for such households if they 
receive an 8 percent real rate of return. These figures rise to 7.3 percent and 2.3 percent, 
respectively, if taxes increase 20 percent when the couple retires.  
These findings are driven, in large part, by the additional taxation of Social 
Security benefits induced by 401(k) withdrawals. For example, absent Social Security 
benefit taxation, the couple earning $50,000 and a 6 percent real return would lower their 
lifetime taxes by 2.2 percent and raise their lifetime spending by 0.5 percent by 
participating fully in a 401(k).  
The picture is quite different for young couples with so much income that 401(k) 
participation cannot a) lower and then raise their marginal income tax rates or b) raise the 
share of their Social Security benefits that is taxable. For such couples 401(k) 
participation means major lifetime tax savings. At a 6 percent real return, a couple 
earning $300,000 per year enjoys a 6.7 percent lifetime tax break, which translates into a 
3.8  percent increase in lifetime spending. These couples continue to garner a major 
lifetime subsidy even if tax rates are raised by as much as a fifth when they retire.  
                                                           
2 The terms “lifetime taxes” and “lifetime spending” refer to present values of these flows, where 
discounting is done using the real rate of return assumed in each experiment.    2
The paper proceeds by showing that the change in lifetime taxes from 401(k) 
participation is of ambiguous sign. It then describes ESPlanner and the stylized young 
households used in our analysis. Next come the findings, which are presented under a 
range of alternative assumptions about rates of return, wage growth, and future tax rates. 
These findings raise a number of policy questions, many of which are taken up in the 
conclusion.  
 
II. The Ambiguous Tax Advantage to 401(k) Participation  
To see the ambiguous nature of the lifetime tax effect of participating in a 401(k), 
consider an agent who lives for two periods, earning a wage of W when young and facing 
a rate of return of r. Suppose the agent contributes an amount H to her 401(k) plan when 
young. Then her lifetime budget constraint is given by:  
(1) Cy + Co/(1+r) = W – Ty[W–H–Dy] – To[Yo +M(B,Yo)]/(1+r) ,  
where Yo stands for taxable income in old age apart from Social Security benefits, i.e.,  
 Y o = (W–Ty(W–H–Dy) –H–Cy)r + H(1+r) – Do ,  
Cy and Co stand for consumption when young and old, respectively, M(B,Yo) stands for 
the amount of taxable Social Security benefits, Dy and Do, stand for deductions when 
young and old, respectively, and Ty( ) and To( ) are tax functions determining income-tax 
payments when young and old. Note that taxable income when young is computed by 
deducting 401(k) contributions, whereas taxable income when old is computed by 
including principal plus interest earned on the contribution.    3
If Social Security benefits were not subject to taxation (M(B,Yo)=0) and both tax 
functions were a fixed tax rate, τ , times their respective tax bases, the household’s 
lifetime budget constraint would equal 
 
(2) Cy + Co/(1+r) = W −  τ (W− H− Dy) −  τ  [(W−τ (W− H− Dy)− H− Cy)r+(1+r)H− Do]/(1+r)]  
 
The right-hand side of (2) is wages less the present value of lifetime tax payments. 
Collecting terms gives 
(3) Cy + Co/(1+r) = W− [τ W−τ Dy+ τ  [(W(1−τ )+τ Dy− Cy)r− Do]/(1+r)−  τ (1−τ )Hr/(1+r)] 
Lifetime net taxes are now written as the lifetime taxes that would be paid absent 401(k) 
contributions less the lifetime tax benefit of contributing to the 401(k). Holding Cy fixed, 
the larger H is, the smaller the agent’s lifetime tax payment is. Thus if tax rates are 
constant and additional taxable income in old age doesn’t trigger additional taxation of 
Social Security benefits, the direct impact of contributing to a 401(k) plan is a reduction 
in lifetime taxes.  
Such contributions may also indirectly lower lifetime taxes through their effect on 
consumption when young. Specifically, if the household is doing positive saving outside 
of the 401(k), 401(k) contributions will be intramarginal. In this case, the reduction in 
lifetime taxes from 401(k) contributions will likely be spent, in part, on more 
consumption when young. This will lower non-401(k) saving and the income taxes paid 
when old on non-401(k) asset income. If all saving is done through the 401(k), non-  4
401(k) saving, (W− τ (W− H− Dy)− H− Cy), will equal zero, and lifetime taxes will consist 
solely of taxes on labor earnings net of deductions.
3  
  Next consider equation (2) under the assumption that tax rates are invariant to the 
tax base, but different when the agent is young and old. In this case,  
(4)  Cy+Co/(1+r)=W− {τ y(W− H− Dy) +τ o[(W−τ y(W− H− Dy)− H− Cy)r+H(1+r)− Do]/(1+r)},  
or 
(5) Cy+Co/(1+r) = 
 W−  {τ y(W− Dy) +τ o[(W−τ y(W− Dy)− Cy)r− Do]/(1+r)− [τ o(1−τ y)rH/(1+r)+(τ y−τ o)H]} 
From (5) it’s clear that lifetime taxes can be increased by contributing to a 401(k) if the 
tax rate when old, τ o, is sufficiently high compared with the tax rate when young, τ y.  
The U.S. federal income tax has five marginal tax brackets with rates of 15 
percent, 28 percent, 31 percent, 36 percent, and 39.6 percent. In the case of a married 
couple filing jointly, the corresponding taxable income tax brackets are $0 to $43,850, 
$43,850 to $105,950, $105,950 to $161,450, $161,450 to $288,350, and $288,350 plus. 
These bracket amounts are indexed to inflation. The Massachusetts state income tax rate, 
which we consider here, is 5.95 percent on every dollar of taxable income. Of course, 
exemptions and deductions can make federal or state taxable income negative, in which 
case no tax is assessed, although the household may receive refundable tax credits of 
various kinds.  
While the current U.S. federal income tax provides low- and middle-income 
households with lots of room for moving into higher tax brackets, compound interest is a 
very powerful force, and one might expect that in a multiperiod model the value of tax 
                                                           
3 This is the well-established point that 401(k) tax treatment effectively eliminates capital income taxation.   5
deferral would outweigh most increases in marginal tax rates that a 401(k) contributor 
might experience. However, the progressivity of the tax schedule is only one reason that a 
401(k) contributor, particularly those in low tax brackets, might wonder about the size of 
their ultimate tax savings. Another reason is the value of tax deductions. Although we’ve 
left it out of the notation, the tax rates τ y and τ o are themselves increasing functions of 
their respective tax bases.
4 Hence, the larger H is, the smaller τ y and τ o will be. If Dy>Do, 
raising H may lower the value of the tax deductions; it will definitely do so if Do equals 
zero. Since mortgage-interest deductions are generally the largest deduction for those 
who itemize and since such deductions are concentrated in youth, 401(k) participation 
has the potential to reduce the value of tax deductions.  
A final and very important factor in assessing the tax implications of 401(k) 
participation is the taxation of Social Security benefits. If the function determining the 
amount of Social Security benefits that are included in taxable income, M(B,Yo), is 
increasing in Yo, larger contributions to 401(k) plans will raise Yo and, thereby, raise the 
amount of taxes paid on Social Security benefits.  
How much of Social Security benefits are included in federal AGI (adjusted gross 
income) depends upon a pair of dollar limits—call them X1 and X2. For single filers 
these limits are $25,000 and $34,000, respectively. For joint filers they are $32,000 and 
$44,000, respectively. These limits are not indexed for inflation, meaning that as nominal 
incomes rise, an ever-larger share of benefits becomes subject to income taxation.
5 
                                                           
4 Or, at least, nondecreasing functions. 
5 The nonindexation of these limits appears to be the brainchild of David Stockman, President Reagan’s 
first director of the Office of Management and Budget. Stockman viewed this as a way of making 
necessary cuts in net benefits through time without anyone noticing.    6
   To determine the amount of Social Security benefits that must be included in 
federal AGI, we first calculate provisional income—which is modified AGI (non-Social 
Security income including tax-exempt interest) plus half of the Social Security benefit. If 
provisional income exceeds X1, but not X2, half of the excess over X1 or half of the 
Social Security benefit, whichever is smaller, is included in AGI. If provisional income 
exceeds X2, then the amount to be included equals the smaller of two items: A) 50 
percent of benefits or $6,000, whichever is smaller, plus 85 percent of the excess of 
provisional income over X2 and B) 85 percent of benefits.  
This is a rather complicated formula. To understand its implications, Table 1 and 
Figure 1 present the share of Social Security that is taxable for different combinations of 
Social Security benefits and the non-Social Security component of AGI (other income). 
The table and figure incorporate high nominal values of Social Security benefits because 
when currently young workers begin receiving their benefits, their nominal benefit values 
will be substantially higher than they are today. For example, assuming a 3 percent rate 
of inflation, the equivalent of a $25,000 benefit in 2001 dollars would be $81,551 in 
2040. The share of Social Security benefits subject to taxation is highly sensitive to the 
level of other income and somewhat sensitive to the level of benefits. Also note that, for 
the range of nominal Social Security benefits shown, the taxable share of benefits equals 
its maximum value of 85 percent for levels of other income of $100,000 or more. 
However, because of Social Security’s taxable earnings ceiling, benefits are capped for 
very high earners. Hence, there’s no room for 401(k) participation to increase benefit 
taxation for very high-income households.    7
With progressive taxes, multiple periods of life, the option to itemize deductions, 
exemptions, tax credits, and the federal and, in some cases, state taxation of Social 
Security benefits, deriving an explicit formula for lifetime tax payments becomes 
intractable. But one can use ESPlanner to calculate annual tax payments and form their 
present value. Furthermore, one can run ESPlanner with and without 401(k) contributions 
to determine the change in lifetime taxes from 401(k) participation as well as its impact 
on the present value of lifetime spending.  
 
III. ESPlanner 
ESPlanner is designed to smooth a household’s living standard over its life cycle 
to the extent possible without having the household go into debt. The appendix details 
ESPlanner’s federal income- and state income-tax calculators, Social Security’s payroll 
tax calculator, and Social Security benefit calculator. The income-tax calculator 
determines whether households should itemize their deductions, computes deductions and 
exemptions, deducts from taxable income contributions to tax-deferred retirement 
accounts, includes in taxable income withdrawals from such accounts as well as the 
taxable component of Social Security benefits, and calculates total tax liabilities. These 
tax calculations are made separately for each year that the couple is alive as well as for 
each year a survivor may be alive.  
The program also takes into account a variety of additional factors involved in 
life-cycle consumption planning, including the nonfungible nature of housing, bequest 
plans, and the desire of households to make “off-the-top” expenditures on college tuition, 
weddings, and other special expenses. ESPlanner recognizes that a household’s   8
expenditures do not directly translate into its standard of living. Adjustments are made for 
household composition and household “economies of scale”—the fact that people can 
live more cheaply together than apart.
6 To be more precise, ESPlanner has a household 
provide for children until they reach age 19, and considers that children may cost more or 
less than adults and that the relative costs of children can vary by age. It also adjusts for 
the number of adult equivalents based on a user-specified degree of economies to scale in 
shared living. Finally, ESPlanner simultaneously calculates the amounts of life insurance 
needed by each spouse to guarantee that potential survivors suffer no decline in their 
living standards compared with what would otherwise be the case.
7  
ESPlanner’s principal outputs are recommended time-paths of consumption 
expenditure, taxable saving, and term-life insurance holdings. All outputs are displayed in 
today’s dollars. Consumption in this context is everything the household gets to spend 
after paying for its “off-the-top” expenditures—its housing expenses, special 
expenditures, life insurance premiums, special bequests, taxes, and net contributions to 
tax-favored accounts. As mentioned, the amount of recommended consumption 
expenditures varies from year to year in response to changes in the household’s 
composition. It also rises when the household moves from being borrowing-constrained 
to being borrowing-unconstrained. Finally, recommended household consumption will 
change over time if users intentionally specify that they want their living standard to 
                                                           
6 From the perspective of economic theory, the household is viewed as maximizing a Leontief 
intertemporal utility function with year-specific time preference and demographic weights subject to 
borrowing constraints and non-negativity constraints on life insurance. 
7 ESPlanner’s recommendations for annual term insurance are either positive or zero. If recommended term 
insurance is positive for a particular potential decedent (the household head or, if married, spouse) in a 
particular year and if the decedent dies at the end of that year, the surviving household will have precisely 
the same living standard as the household would have had absent the decedent’s premature death. If the 
potential decedent’s recommended insurance in a particular year is zero, the surviving household will have 
the same or higher living standard if the decedent dies in that year.   9
change. For example, if users specify that they desire a 10 percent higher living standard 
after a certain year in the future, the software will incorporate that preference in making 
its recommendations, provided that it does not violate a borrowing constraint. 
ESPlanner’s recommended saving in a particular year equals the household’s total 
income (non-asset plus asset income) in that year minus that year’s sum of (a) 
recommended spending on consumption and insurance premiums, (b) specified spending 
on housing and special expenditures, (c) taxes, and (d) net contributions to tax-favored 
accounts (contributions less withdrawals). Given the household’s data inputs, 
preferences, and borrowing constraints, ESPlanner recommends the highest and 
smoothest possible living standard over time, leaving the household with zero terminal 
assets apart from the equity in homes that the user has indicated would not be sold. 
 
IV. Defining Our Stylized Couples 
Our stylized couples consist of a husband and wife who are both 25 and live at 
most to 95. Each spouse works to 65 and earns half of the household’s total earnings, 
which range from $25,000 to $1 million per year when they are 25. Real earnings grow 
annually by 1 percent. The couples live in Massachusetts and have no initial assets apart 
from their homes. Each couple has two children. The first is born when the couple is 25 
and the second when the couple is 30. The market value of each couple’s house is set at 
three times household labor earnings as of age 25.  
Each couple purchases its house at age 25 by paying 20 percent down and 
borrowing the remainder at 8 percent for 30 years. Annual homeowner’s insurance, 
property taxes, and maintenance are set at 0.17 percent, 1 percent, and 1 percent of house   10
value, respectively. Each child attends college for four years. A couple earning $25,000 
per year spends, by assumption, $7,500 per child for each year of college. This college 
expense is set to $15,000 for couples earning $50,000 and $30,000 for couples earning 
$100,000 or $150,000. For couples earning $200,000 or more per year, annual college 
expenses are capped at $35,000. There are no bequests apart from the value of home 
equity.  
  Our calculations assume elective employee contributions and employer matching 
contributions equal to the average of maximum contributions permitted by employer-
provided, defined-contribution plans. The household’s elective contribution is set at 13.5 
percent of earnings and the employer-matching contribution is set at 3 percent of 
earnings, bringing the total 401(k) contribution to 16.5 percent of earnings. At this 
contribution rate, the dollar-contribution ceiling limits the household’s contribution to 
$60,000 at earnings exceeding $363,636.36.
8  
Our method of determining the lifetime net tax benefit of 401(k) participation is 
to compare lifetime taxes and spending with and without such participation. But to make 
the comparison meaningful, we need to ensure that the couple’s gross income is the same 
in both cases. To do so we increase each spouse’s earnings in the case they don’t 
contribute to a 401(k) plan by the amount the employer contributes to their plan in the 
case that they do contribute. Hence, in the no-401(k) participation case, this additional 
income is subject to immediate federal and state income taxation as well as to payroll 
taxation.  
 
                                                           
8 We assume this ceiling grows at 1 percent real per year.    11
V. Findings  
  Table 2 shows life-cycle profiles of spending, consumption, income (net of 401(k) 
contributions, but gross of withdrawals), taxes, and regular assets for the couple with 
$50,000 in initial earnings ($25,000 per spouse). Spending refers to all expenditures on 
consumption, life insurance premiums, housing, and tuition. The table assumes a 6 
percent real rate of return. These profiles are calculated for the two cases that the spouses 
do and do not contribute to 401(k) plans. Changes over time in the level of consumption 
in the two cases reflect the arrival and exit of children from the household and the 
binding force of borrowing constraints.  
The table shows dramatic differences between the two cases. With 401(k) 
participation the couple is severely borrowing-constrained (a point stressed in Gokhale, 
Kotlikoff, and Warshawsky, 2000) and must reduce its consumption dramatically when 
young in order to make its 401(k) contributions. Indeed, the couple’s age-25 consumption 
declines by 24 percent because of participation. However, this sacrifice in consumption 
when young permits a 277 percent greater level of consumption in old age than would 
otherwise be the case. Participation in the 401(k) also tilts the couple’s age-income 
profile. With participation, income at 25 is 19 percent less and income at 65 is 241 
percent greater than in the no-participation case. Since this income is taxable, taxes are 
lower when the couple is young and higher, indeed much higher, when the couple is old. 
Note that the couple is borrowing-constrained when young even in the absence of 
401(k) participation. And the couple’s regular asset accumulation, once it begins, is 
relatively modest. The explanation is that the couple is contributing so heavily to Social 
Security and is receiving sufficiently large benefits from that program that it has little   12
need and wherewithal to do additional saving. This picture, writ large, goes a long way in 
explaining Americans’ low rate of personal saving.  
Table 3 shows the impact of 401(k) participation on lifetime taxes and spending, 
assuming the couple earns either a 4, 6, or 8 percent real rate of return on its regular as 
well as 401(k) assets. For each case, the present values of lifetime taxes and spending are 
formed using the same rate of return assumed in generating the data. The figures in the 
table report the percentage changes in lifetime taxes and spending. Because U.S. federal 
tax rate schedules are progressive (average tax rates rise with taxable income), a given 
percentage change in taxes translates into a higher percentage change in spending (with 
the opposite sign) for high-income individuals than for low-income individuals.
9 
 
Gains and Losses from 401(k) Participation 
Table 3, which considers the gains from 401(k) participation, contains a number 
of striking findings. Of foremost interest are the results for low-income households who 
earn a 6 and 8 percent real return on their investments. For these households, 401(k) 
participation raises lifetime taxes and lowers lifetime spending. Take the couple with 
$50,000 per year in earnings that receives a 6 percent real return. 401(k) participation 
translates into 1.1 percent higher lifetime net taxes and a 0.39 percent reduction in 
lifetime spending. If the couple earns 8, rather than 6 percent real return on its assets, the 
tax hike is 6.4 percent and the spending reduction is 1.7 percent. If, on the other hand, the 
couple earns a 4 percent real return, 401(k) participation leads to a 3.3 percent reduction 
in lifetime taxes and a 0.7 percent increase in lifetime spending.  
                                                           
9 Let S stand for the spending, E for earnings, T for taxes, and B for benefits, all measured in present value. 
Then ∆ S/S = (T/(E+B-T))∆ T/T.   13
Consider next Table 3’s finding for upper-income households. Households with 
incomes of $200,000 or more enjoy a tax reduction from 401(k) participation regardless 
of the rate of return. However, the percentage reductions in lifetime taxes are not as large 
for the couple that initially earns $1,000,000 as they are for other upper-income 
households because combined employee-employer 401(k) contributions are limited by 
law to the lesser of 25 percent of earnings or $30,000.  
Why, according to Table 3, is 401(k) participation worse if a couple earns an 8 
rather than a 6 percent real rate of return? Since participating in 401(k) plans reduces 
capital income taxes, a higher rate of return would seemingly increase the benefit from 
participating. However, a higher rate of return implies greater asset accumulation within 
the 401(k) plan and larger plan withdrawals. For middle- and low-income households this 
means being pushed into higher marginal rate brackets in retirement and/or finding that 
more of one’s Social Security benefits are subject to taxation. For upper income 
households, who rely much less on Social Security to finance their retirements, earning a 
higher rate of return significantly raises one’s taxable capital income and therefore one’s 
lifetime tax payments. Hence, 401(k) participation has a smaller percentage impact on 
lifetime tax payments and, therefore, on lifetime spending. 
Table 4 sheds some more light on why 401(k) participation can be a costly 
experience for low-income couples. It considers the couple with $50,000 in initial labor 
income and access to a 6 percent real return. It then successively adds Social Security, 
housing, children, and college tuition to the case. If the couple did not participate in 
Social Security, had no home, had no children, and faced no tuition expenses, 401(k)   14
participation would provide a tremendous subsidy; it would reduce lifetime taxes by over 
one quarter and increase lifetime spending by almost 9 percent!  
Forcing the couple to contribute to Social Security dramatically lowers its 401(k) 
lifetime tax reduction (to less than 5 percent) and the percentage by which it can increase 
its spending (to less than 2 percent). Once the couple adds the expense of housing, 
including a deductible mortgage, the household is left essentially indifferent between 
participating and not participating in a 401(k). This, of course, assumes the household 
cares only about the present value of spending, not the timing of its spending. For, as 
we’ve seen, participating in a 401(k) plan comes at the price of a major reduction in 
consumption when young relative to old.  
With the addition of children and their college tuition needs, 401(k) participation 
no longer saves taxes. It raises them. With children come additional tax exemptions. The 
tax savings from these exemptions will be reduced by 401(k) participation if such 
participation lowers the household’s tax bracket when young. Spending down regular 
assets for college tuition leads the household to enter retirement with relatively little 
income other than Social Security benefits. Consequently, it is in a position to have the 
taxation of its Social Security benefits greatly influenced by the amount of its 401(k) 
withdrawals. 
 
401(k) Participation and Marginal Tax Rates 
Table 5 explores the changes in marginal tax brackets that the couple earning 
$50,000 at 25 experiences from 401(k) participation. It shows changes in federal, state, 
and payroll taxes when ESPlanner is rerun after incrementing the household’s earnings   15
by $100 at selected ages. The smoothing of lifetime consumption in response to receiving 
an extra $100 in a future year, say t, raises consumption in earlier years and induces the 
household to accumulate fewer assets through year t. Hence, year-t taxable income 
increases by less than $100. For example, if the household is in the 15 percent federal 
income tax bracket in year t, those taxes rise by slightly less than $15. 
Table 5 shows that 401(k) participation lowers the couple’s federal marginal tax 
rate during middle age, but raises it after retirement.
10 Without 401(k) participation, the 
household is nominally in the 15 percent federal income-tax bracket after age 65, but an 
additional $100 of earnings at this age generates an additional tax liability of $27; i.e., the 
effective marginal tax rate is 27 percent. This occurs because less than 85 percent of the 
household’s Social Security benefits are subject to taxation and an increment to earnings 
triggers an increase in the amount of taxable benefits, making the increment to taxable 
earnings $180.  
With participation, 401(k)-plan withdrawals are so large that taxable Social 
Security benefits are already at their upper limit of 85 percent. So, the increase in Social 
Security benefit taxation from 401(k) participation is purely intramarginal: An increase in 
other income pulls in additional Social Security benefits into taxable income. For the 
$50,000 household considered earlier, the effective marginal tax rate in retirement is 
roughly 10 percentage points higher with 401(k) participation than without. This is 
because the effective federal marginal rate rises from 27 percent to 31 percent and the 
effective state marginal tax rate rises from zero to 5.5 percent. The couple’s large 401(k) 
                                                           
10 This table ignores employer-paid payroll taxes. Our subsequent analysis takes such tax payments into 
account in recognizing that employer contributions to 401(k) plans are not subject to payroll taxation.   16
withdrawals shift the household from the 15 to the 31 percent federal statutory marginal 
rate bracket and from the 0 to the 5.95 percent state statutory rate bracket.  
Table 5’s change in the state marginal tax rate across the no-participation and 
participation cases deserves further discussion: Without participation, there is a slight 
decline in the state tax liability when age-65 earnings are increased by $100. 
Massachusetts allows exemptions and deductions only on non-asset income (earnings, 
pensions, and annuities). Without participation, age-65 non-asset income (including the 
$100 increment), net of allowable exemptions and deductions, is zero. This makes asset 
income the only source of taxable income and, again, the $100 increment induces the 
household to accumulate fewer assets through age 65. With participation, however, non-
asset income, net of exemptions and deductions, is positive. Now, an increment of $100 
triggers an additional tax liability of $5.49—again slightly less than the statutory 
marginal tax of 5.95 percent because of smaller asset accumulation through age 65. The 
change induced in asset accumulation also lowers the federal marginal tax recorded in the 
table from the statutory rate of 31 percent.  
 
The Impact of Changing Social Security Benefit Taxation 
How would the gains from 401(k) participation change if Congress were to index 
for inflation the dollar limits, X1 and X2, which determine taxable Social Security 
benefits? Table 6 provides the answer. For the $50,000 household, inflation indexing 
raises the nominal value of X1 and eliminates Social Security benefit taxation in the no-
participation case. But with participation, indexing the limits makes no difference to 
Social Security benefit taxation. The reason is that the 401(k) withdrawals are so large   17
that non-Social Security taxable income exceeds the top limit even if the limit is indexed 
to inflation. Indeed, despite the indexation of the thresholds, the full 85 percent of Social 
Security benefits remains taxable.  
Given that the policy of indexing the limits lowers the taxes paid by the non-
401(k) participating household and leaves unchanged the taxes paid by the 401(k)-
participating household, indexation makes participating in a 401(k) an even worse choice. 
Table 6 shows this. The percentage increase in the present value of taxes and the 
percentage decline in the present value of spending are both larger with participation than 
without.  
At high earnings levels or high rates of return, the same reasoning explains the 
smaller percentage increases in the present value of spending and the smaller percentage 
declines in the present value of taxes from participating in a 401(k) plan. Again, because 
indexing the dollar limits reduces the amount of benefits subject to taxation only when 
not participating, tax savings from participating are smaller in present value. The 
exception is the $25,000 household reaping a 4 percent real rate of return on assets. In 
this case, 401(k) plan withdrawals are not large enough to trigger additional Social 
Security taxes when the dollar limits are indexed. Hence, compared to Table 3, tax 
savings and spending increases are larger with 401(k) participation. In general, indexing 
the dollar limits that determine the taxable portion of Social Security benefits will help 
those who do not participate in tax-favored saving plans, but will increase the lifetime 
loss (lower the lifetime gain) from participating for all but the lowest earners. 
Table 7 shows the effect of eliminating Social Security benefit taxation altogether. 
Now, participating in a 401(k) plan does not induce any intramarginal increase in taxable   18
Social Security benefits. As a result, the lifetime tax liability decreases and the present 
value of spending increases for the $50,000 household earning a 6 percent real return on 
assets. Indeed, all cases with a negative lifetime spending change in Table 6 now have a 
positive or a smaller negative change in Table 7. 
 
The Implications of Future Tax Increases and Bracket Adjustments 
Table 8 repeats Table 3 but assumes that federal income tax rates will be 
increased by 20 percent when the couple reaches age 65. Compared with Table 3, Table 8 
shows smaller percentage reductions in lifetime taxes from 401(k) participation at all but 
the top income level. For a low-income ($25,000 per year of earnings) couple earning an 
8 percent real return, lifetime taxes are raised by almost 11 percent and lifetime spending 
is reduced by just over 2 percent. In contrast, high-income households continue to benefit 
substantially from their 401(k) saving program. For example, at a 4 percent real return, a 
couple earning $300,000 enjoys an 8.2 percent reduction in lifetime taxes that finances a 
6.3 percent increase in lifetime spending. The gap in treatment between these two couples 
is, then, 8 percent of lifetime spending. 
Table 9 considers an alternative assumption to indexing nominal tax brackets to 
inflation, namely indexing them to nominal wages, which are assumed to grow at 4.03 
percent.
11 This assumption precludes real bracket creep and means that our stylized 
households will be in lower tax brackets in retirement than with just inflation indexation. 
As a comparison of Table 9 and Table 3 makes clear, this alternative assumption about 
indexing tax brackets makes very little difference to calculated gains and losses from 
                                                           
11 One minus the product of one plus the assumed 3 percent inflation rate times one plus the assumed 1 
percent growth rate in real wages.   19
401(k) participation. While indexing the tax system to wage growth lowers lifetime taxes 
and raises lifetime spending, it doesn’t alter by very much the percentage change in 
lifetime taxes and spending from participating fully in a 401(k) plan.  
 
Alternative Assumptions  
Table 10 conducts our with- and without-401(k) comparison under the assumption 
that the household desires a 10 percent higher living standard in retirement. Table 11 
makes the opposite assumption, namely that the household’s living standard is 10 percent 
lower during retirement. Relative to Table 3, Table 10 shows larger declines (or smaller 
increases) in lifetime taxes and larger increases (or smaller declines) in lifetime spending 
due to 401(k) participation across all earnings-rate-of-return combinations. Table 11 
shows the opposite.  
 
Lowering Contributions 
Table 3 demonstrates that fully participating in 401(k) plans may turn out to be 
detrimental to low-income and moderate-income households. What would be the 
consequence of reducing contribution rates by 50 percent? Table 12 provides the answer. 
At a 6 percent real rate of return, the household earning $50,000 per year now enjoys a 
lifetime tax cut of 2.6 percent and a lifetime spending gain of 0.64 percent. These figures 
correspond to the 1.1 percent increase in lifetime taxes and the 0.39 percent reduction in 
lifetime spending reported for this couple if it contributes fully to the 401(k) plan. These 
results show that low-income households may be better served by limiting their 
contribution rates because doing so helps them avoid being taxed at higher rates during   20
the withdrawal phase of their lifetimes. Making smaller contributions delivers small but 
positive benefits if rates of return turn out to be low. If rates turn out to be high, such 
households would break even at worst.  
The fact that low- and moderate-income workers are likely to do better 
contributing less than the maximum allowable amounts together with the severe 
borrowing constraints they are likely to face when making maximum contributions helps 
explain the findings of Poterba, Venti, and Weiss (2001), that 401(k) participants 
typically contribute only about 9 percent of their earnings to their plans.  
 
Delaying or Shortening Contributions  
Table 13 reports results under the assumption that the household does not 
commence participation until age 40. For low-income households, waiting until middle 
age to begin full participation is beneficial relative to making maximum contributions 
beginning at age 25. The same reasoning applies here as in the case of Table 12. Smaller 
accumulations in a tax-deferred plan imply smaller future withdrawals. This prevents 
taxation at a higher-rate bracket during retirement. Households earning less than $50,000 
now enjoy significant lifetime tax savings and non-negligible increments to lifetime 
spending from participation.  
Table 14 shows the results assuming that the household contributes only during 
the first 25 years (as opposed to the last 25 years as in Table 13). Here, despite saving for 
the same number of periods as in Table 13, the savings in 401(k) accounts accumulate 
over a longer period of time and result in larger withdrawals upon retirement. This 
exposes retirement income, including Social Security benefits, to higher tax rates—just as   21
in the case of Table 3. The patterns of tax and spending changes are similar to those in 
Table 3.  
 
Higher Real Wage Growth 
If real annual wage growth is 2 percent rather than 1 percent, higher future wages 
may result in taxation at a higher marginal rate even without participation. After the first 
rate-bracket jump in marginal income tax rates (from 15 to 28 percent) subsequent 
increments in income tax rates are much smaller (to 31, 36, and 39.6 percent). Moreover, 
the dollar range between brackets is wider after the second bracket of $43,850 
(subsequent brackets are set at $105,950, $161,450, and $288,350). Hence, with higher 
wage growth, participating in a tax-deferred saving plan reduces the likelihood that low 
earners will be subject to higher marginal income tax rates because of large future plan 
withdrawals. As Table 15 shows, low-income earners, whose earnings grow 2 percent 
annually and whose investments earn a 6 percent real return, raise their lifetime spending 
by a small margin by participating fully in a 401(k) plan.  
The dollar distance between brackets is widest after $161,450, and the next rate 
jump is just 3.6 percentage points (from 36 percent to 39.6 percent). This suggests that 
the benefit from participation would be quite high for those earning around $150,000. 
Earning $150,000 at 25 with real wage growth at 1 percent per year amounts to earnings 
at 65 of approximately $223,300 (measured in 2001 dollars)—less than the next bracket’s 
dollar amount. With 2 percent annual wage growth, however, age-65 earnings become 
approximately $331,200 (measured in 2001 dollars) —exceeding the highest rate bracket. 
Therefore, unlike the case where wage growth is 1 percent per year, participating under 2   22
percent wage growth does not further bump up the tax-rate bracket during the withdrawal 
phase of the household’s lifetime. Table 15 shows that the lifetime spending increase for 
the household earning $150,000 and investing at a 6 percent real rate of return is 2.54 
percent—considerably higher than the corresponding lifetime spending increase in Table 
3 of 1.15 percent. 
 
Contributing to Regular and Roth IRAs 
Not all employers offer tax-deferred saving plans. For workers in such firms, 
access to tax-sheltered saving plans is limited to regular or Roth IRAs. The contribution 
limits to these saving vehicles are much lower: $2,000 per spouse per year. Table 16 
shows the lifetime tax and spending advantage from investing up to the $2,000 limit in a 
regular IRA throughout one’s working lifetime. The table assumes, counterfactually, that 
high-income workers are able to contribute the same amount to a regular IRA. Table 17 
repeats the exercise, but assumes an annual $5,000 contribution limit. This higher limit is 
proposed in a bill now being considered by Congress.
12 Table 16 shows that contributing 
at the $2,000 limit is a tax saver for all couples except for the lowest-earning couple that 
invests at 8 percent real.  
In contrast, Table 17 shows that investing $5,000 per year to a regular IRA would 
be a mistake for almost all couples earning $50,000 or less. Take the couple that initially 
earns $25,000. If the couple invests $5,000 per year to a regular IRA and does so at an 8 
percent real return, it will raise its lifetime taxes by almost 30 percent and lower its 
lifetime spending by almost 5 percent. This is an extreme outcome, as households earning   23
$25,000 per year are unlikely to save $5,000 in a traditional IRA. All upper-income 
households with comparable saving levels will gain on a lifetime basis if the IRA saving 
limit were increased from $2,000 to $5,000. 
Tables 18 and 19 show the impact of contributing $2,000 and $5,000 per year to 
Roth IRAs. Saving in these plans is done on an after-tax basis with withdrawals not 
subject to taxation. All within-plan accumulations are tax-free as well. Roth IRAs also 
eliminate the risk that plan withdrawals will be subject to higher tax rates. Hence, saving 
in these plans confers a tax and spending advantage at all income levels. However, the 
pattern of gains remains regressive. Interestingly, raising the contribution limit from 
$2,000 to $5,000 makes very little difference for couples earning $50,000 or less, but 
roughly doubles the tax savings of those with higher incomes.  
 
VI. Summary and Conclusion  
  Participating fully in 401(k) and similar tax-deferred saving vehicles appears to 
raise, rather than lower, the lifetime tax payments of most workers, namely those with 
low and moderate incomes. While contributing to such retirement accounts lowers 
current taxes, the increase in taxes paid on the withdrawal of accumulated contributions 
can exceed the immediate tax reduction when measured in present value. There are three 
forces at work. First, the size of the withdrawals can be large enough to place the 
household in a higher tax bracket, both at federal and state levels. Second, the size of the 
withdrawals can substantially raise the share of Social Security benefits subject to federal 
income taxation. Third, the size of the contributions can lower tax brackets when young 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 A pension reform bill sponsored by Representatives Rob Portman (R-OH) and Ben Cardin, (D-MD) 
proposes these modifications. The current bill—the “Comprehensive Retirement Security and Pension   24
and middle aged and, thereby, reduce the value of current mortgage and other tax 
deductions.  
Calculations for married couples based on ESPlanner—a detailed, life-cycle 
personal financial planning model—show that contributing the maximum amounts 
stipulated by typical 401(k) plans and investing these contributions at a moderate 6 
percent real rate of return raises, rather than lowers, the lifetime tax payments of low- and 
moderate-income couples. Similar results hold for low- and moderate-income households 
contributing annually the maximum permitted amount to a regular IRA.  
In contrast, high-income couples, who, at least under current law, cannot be 
pushed into higher tax brackets and who face the maximum taxation of their Social 
Security benefits regardless of their tax-deferred withdrawals, reap major lifetime tax 
savings from 401(k) participation. At a 6 percent real return, a couple with annual 
earnings of $300,000 reduces its lifetime taxes by almost 7 percent through full 401(k) 
participation. This translates into close to a 4 percent increase in lifetime spending.  
The taxation of Social Security benefits appears to be the most important factor in 
transforming full 401(k) participation from a good to a bad deal for most workers who 
earn moderate to high rates of return on their savings. Indexing to inflation the nominal 
thresholds at which this benefit taxation is activated might seem like a way to remedy this 
situation. But such a policy would do more for non-401(k) participants than for 401(k) 
participants. Indeed, because of the potential size of 401(k) withdrawals, indexing the 
income-tax thresholds of Social Security benefits would do little, if anything, to alter the 
extent to which Social Security benefits are subject to taxation. Raising the nominal 
thresholds at a faster pace than inflation is another option, but one that would leave more 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Reform Act"—is very similar to H.R. 1102, which overwhelmingly passed the House twice in 2000.   25
of the middle class wishing, ex-post, that they hadn’t participated in a 401(k). A third 
option is limiting the maximum share of Social Security benefits subject to taxation. In 
this regard, it’s worth noting that some members of Congress are advocating returning to 
pre-1993 provisions under which a maximum of 50 percent of Social Security benefits is 
subject to federal income taxation. A fourth policy is leaving out retirement account 
withdrawals from the calculation of the portion of Social Security benefits that are 
subject to income taxation.  
Another policy that merits consideration in light of our findings is the repeal of 
nondiscrimination rules. According to these rules, the average of tax-deferred 
contribution rates by a firm’s highly compensated employees cannot exceed the average 
for non-highly compensated employees by more than a factor of 1.25.
13 Such rules lead 
firms to encourage their low-income employees to raise their contribution rates so that 
highly compensated employees can increase their contribution rates as well.  
Tax policy with respect to 401(k) and similar tax-deferred saving vehicles is, of 
course, only one component of a complex fiscal system. But it’s a remarkably regressive 
component. The policy appears to raise the lifetime taxes of many of the poor, while 
substantially lowering those of the rich, assuming they are a) lucky enough to work for an 
employer with a generous 401(k) or similar plan and b) take full advantage of the 
opportunity to contribute. The fact that employers have, at their discretion, the power to 
convey such large tax breaks on their highly compensated workers and convey nontrivial 
                                                           
13 Alternatively, the average of tax-deferred contribution rates by HCEs can exceed the average for NCEs 
by a factor of 2 as long as this is not more than 2 percentage points above the NCEs’ average tax-deferred 
contribution rate. HCEs include workers earning more than $85,000 or those in the top 20 percent of a 
firm’s earners. More recently, “safe harbor” rules have been introduced that allow a firm to ignore 
nondiscrimination requirements. To do so, the firm must either a) make immediately vested matching 
contributions of 100 percent up to the first 3 percent and 50 percent of the next 2 percent (alternatively, 100   26
tax increases on their low and moderately compensated workers begs the question of 
whether employers should be allowed to exercise such great control over their workers’ 
saving incentives. Indeed, the regressivity of tax-deferred saving incentives begs the 
more general question of whether the limits on contributions to 401(k) and similar tax-
deferred saving vehicles should be lowered. Such a policy would, however, be orthogonal 
to current Congressional intent.  
Assuming the government doesn’t alter its policies, are there steps employers and 
their low- and moderate-income workers can take to respond to the findings presented 
here? There are indeed. Employers seeking to lower rather than raise the lifetime tax 
payments of such workers might consider abandoning their 401(k) plans in favor of 
making direct contributions to Roth IRAs for their workers. Alternatively, they might 
consider reducing the contributions they make on their workers’ behalf to their 401(k) 
plans and instead contributing the same amounts to Roth IRAs or to taxable saving 
vehicles established in their employees’ names.  
For individual low- and moderate-income workers who are unable to get their 
employers to redirect their matching contributions, remaining in the company’s 401(k) 
plan is likely to be better than withdrawing. The reason is that typical employer matches 
exceed the lifetime tax increases 401(k) participation would cause, as computed here. But 
such workers should consider carefully whether they wish to contribute on their own to 
the plan once their contribution is large enough to secure their employers’ match. 
Another issue is whether low- and moderate-income workers who participate in a 401(k) 
should invest in lower-yielding securities to limit their exposure to higher taxes in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
percent of the first 4 percent) of workers’ elective contributions, or b) provide immediately vested “across-
the-board,” tax-deferred contributions of 3 percent of wages for all workers regardless of participation.   27
retirement. The answer here is “no.” Given that the marginal tax on additional 401(k) 
income neither equals nor exceeds 100 percent, earning a higher rate of return on one’s 
401(k) assets is always better than earning a lower rate of return. Our point, instead, is 
that many workers would do better to earn the same higher rate of return by saving in a 
Roth IRA or in a taxable account.  
To conclude, the federal government has spent over a quarter of a century 
encouraging workers of all stripes to save in tax-deferred retirement accounts. In 
promoting participation in such plans, the government has encouraged workers to believe 
they would be saving taxes on a lifetime, rather than simply a short-term, basis. For those 
at the upper end of the nation’s income distribution, tax-deferred saving does, indeed, 
convey significant lifetime tax benefits. But for those at the lower end, 401(k) 
participation may represent more of a tax trap than a tax shelter.    28
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Share of Social Security Income Included in Taxable Income 
 
  Social Security Income 
  10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000
Other Income       
10,000  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.17  0.20 
20,000  0.00 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.27  0.28 
30,000  0.15 0.20 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36  0.37 
40,000  0.59 0.56 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45  0.45 
50,000  0.85 0.85 0.80 0.70 0.65 0.61 0.58 0.56 0.55  0.54 
60,000  0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.82 0.75 0.71 0.67 0.64  0.62 
70,000  0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.78 0.74  0.71 
80,000  0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.83  0.79 
90,000  0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85  0.85 









































































Life-Cycle Profiles Assuming $50,000 of Earnings at Age 25 
and a 6 Percent Real Rate of Return 
 
(constant 2000 dollars) 
        
  No 401(k) Participation  401(k) Participation 
Age  Spending  Consumption  Income  Taxes Assets Spending Consumption  Income Taxes  Assets
25  41,388 27,788  51,500  10,112 0  34,901 21,223 41,750  8,349 0 
35  46,049 35,075  56,890  10,266 0  38,581 27,750 46,114  8,886  307 
45  54,542 30,107  63,741  10,422 9,968  47,600 23,735 51,960  11,969 11,259
55  38,922  34,960 70,248  10,586 26,178 43,632 40,814  56,266  14,661 0 
65  38,176 34,960  38,615  10,765 175,953 100,276 97,021  131,595  31,320 0 
75  38,212 34,960  36,444  10,020 138,286 100,276 97,021  131,595  31,320 0 
85  38,446 34,960  33,234  10,160 82,673  100,276 97,021  131,595  31,320 0 
95  38,166 34,960  28,464  10,314 0  100,276 97,021  131,595  31,320 0 







Percentage Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k) Participation 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending
25,000  -2.70 0.29 1.66 -0.36 9.37 -1.60 
50,000  -3.34 0.70 1.10 -0.39 6.38 -1.73 
100,000  -5.23 1.95 -2.40 0.89 0.84 -0.35 
150,000  -5.87 2.81 -2.44 1.15 0.38 -0.18 
200,000  -8.32 4.33 -5.19 2.62 -2.56 1.24 
250,000  -8.97 5.14 -6.55 3.58 -4.23 2.22 
300,000  -8.43 5.10 -6.71 3.84 -4.23 2.31 
1,000,000  -4.68 3.61 -4.56 3.24 -4.50 2.99 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 
annual taxes and spending on consumption, housing, college tuition, and life insurance premiums.    31
Table 4 
 
Decomposing the Percentage Change in the Present Values of Taxes and Spending  
 
Included Factors  Taxes  Spending 
Earnings  -26.19 8.68 
Earnings and Social Security  -4.71 1.49 
Earnings, Social Security, and Housing  -0.56 0.07 
Earnings, Social Security, Housing, and Kids  0.37 -0.19 
Earnings, Social Security, Housing, Kids, and College  1.10 -0.39 










Percentage Marginal Tax Rates At Selected Ages  
 
$50,000 Earnings, 6% Real Rate of Return, Social Security, Housing, Children, College 
 
Age  No 401(k) Participation  401(k) Participation 
  Federal State Payroll  All  Federal State Payroll  All 
25  14.18 5.49  7.65 27.32  14.18 5.49  7.65 27.32 
35  14.07 5.93  7.65 27.64  14.17 5.98  7.66 27.80 
45  25.27 5.71  7.65 38.64  13.33 5.62  7.65 26.60 
55  27.87 5.92  7.65 41.44  27.92 5.93  7.65 41.49 
65  26.99 -0.16 7.65 34.47  30.98 5.49  7.65 44.12 
75  26.55 -0.25 7.65 33.95  30.97 5.49  7.65 44.11 
85  26.32 -0.31 7.65 33.66  30.99 5.49  7.65 44.13 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
   32
Table 6 
 
Percent Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k) Participation 
Inflation-Indexing Dollar Limits for Determining Taxable Social Security Benefits 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending 
25,000  -10.76  1.64 1.67 -0.36 9.37 -1.60 
50,000  -1.98 0.33 2.47 -0.74 7.47 -2.00 
100,000  -3.48 1.23 -1.12 0.38 1.64 -0.65 
150,000  -4.15 1.93 -1.54 0.71 0.67 -0.31 
200,000  -3.75 3.90 -2.41 2.47 -1.18 1.19 
250,000  -4.62 4.85 -3.38 3.50 -2.15 2.20 
300,000  -4.68 4.91 -3.64 3.78 -2.24 2.29 
1,000,000  -3.48 3.60 -3.13 3.23 -2.90 2.99 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 







Percent Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k) Participation 
Eliminating the Income Taxation of Social Security Benefits 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending 
25,000  -11.62  1.78 -5.04 0.77 4.91 -0.86 
50,000  -9.55 2.31 -2.24 0.50 4.22 -1.15 
100,000  -8.61 3.18 -4.42 1.64 0.01 -0.03 
150,000  -7.71 3.54 -3.32 1.52 0.15 -0.07 
200,000  -9.26 4.63 -5.45 2.68 -2.46 1.17 
250,000  -9.58 5.25 -6.63 3.54 -4.08 2.11 
300,000  -8.78 5.10 -6.41 3.58 -4.02 2.17 
1,000,000  -4.48 3.38 -4.37 3.07 -4.36 2.87 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 
annual taxes and spending on consumption, housing, college tuition, and life insurance premiums.    33
Table 8 
 
Percent Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k) Participation 
Assuming 20 Percent Higher Tax Liability after Retirement 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending 
25,000  -2.45 0.30 2.27 -0.51  10.69  -2.03 
50,000  -2.49 0.57 2.10 -0.75 7.29 -2.27 
100,000  -4.39 1.94 -1.65 0.71 1.49 -0.71 
150,000  -4.94 2.84 -1.73 0.98 0.87 -0.49 
200,000  -7.60 4.88 -4.59 2.85 -2.12 1.27 
250,000  -8.55 6.15 -5.99 4.10 -3.81 2.50 
300,000  -8.15 6.25 -6.29 4.57 -3.75 2.58 
1,000,000  -5.01 5.17 -4.79 4.52 -4.55 3.99 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 






Percent Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k) Participation 
Assuming Nominal Tax Brackets Are Indexed to Nominal Wages 
 
  Real Return  
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending 
25,000  -3.08 0.35 1.10 -0.26 8.87 -1.50 
50,000  -3.39 0.71 1.10 -0.39 6.39 -1.73 
100,000  -5.26 1.96 -2.41 0.89 0.87 -0.36 
150,000  -5.88 2.80 -2.43 1.14 0.42 -0.19 
200,000  -8.33 4.32 -5.18 2.60 -2.52 1.22 
250,000  -9.02 5.15 -6.57 3.58 -4.24 2.22 
300,000  -8.48 5.12 -6.75 3.86 -4.27 2.32 
1,000,000  -4.68 3.61 -4.56 3.23 -4.51 2.99 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 
annual taxes and spending on consumption, housing, college tuition, and life insurance premiums.    34
Table 10 
 
Percentage Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k) Participation  
Assuming a Desired 10 Percent Higher Living Standard in Retirement 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending 
25,000  -3.10 0.36 1.32 -0.31 9.09 -1.56 
50,000  -4.06 0.90 0.46 -0.22 5.85 -1.60 
100,000  -5.80 2.19 -2.85 1.07 0.51 -0.22 
150,000  -6.54 3.16 -2.99 1.42 0.00 0.00 
200,000  -9.07 4.82 -5.66 2.88 -2.95 1.44 
250,000  -9.57 5.60 -7.28 4.03 -4.58 2.42 
300,000  -9.02 5.57 -7.57 4.40 -4.59 2.52 
1,000,000  -5.18 4.11 -4.87 3.52 -4.72 3.17 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 






Percent Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k) Participation 
Assuming a Desired 10 Percent Lower Living Standard in Retirement 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending
25,000  -2.24 0.21 2.05 -0.43 9.67 -1.65 
50,000  -2.53 0.48 1.79 -0.57 6.93 -1.87 
100,000  -4.67 1.72 -1.84 0.66 1.22 -0.49 
150,000  -5.09 2.40 -1.89 0.88 0.68 -0.31 
200,000  -7.74 3.99 -4.67 2.34 -2.15 1.04 
250,000  -8.46 4.76 -6.08 3.30 -3.86 2.01 
300,000  -7.92 4.70 -5.99 3.39 -3.85 2.09 
1,000,000  -4.09 3.07 -4.20 2.94 -4.29 2.82 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 
annual taxes and spending on consumption, housing, college tuition, and life insurance premiums.    35
Table 12 
 
Percentage Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k) Participation 
Assuming 50 Percent Smaller Contributions 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending
25,000  -5.64 0.84 -1.50 0.21 1.13 -0.20 
50,000  -4.54 1.09 -2.60 0.64 0.19 -0.08 
100,000  -4.57 1.73 -4.05 1.54 -0.77 1.70 
150,000  -4.94 2.34 -4.28 2.00 -1.94 0.88 
200,000  -6.26 3.23 -5.68 2.84 -3.22 1.55 
250,000  -7.47 4.25 -6.55 3.56 -4.23 2.20 
300,000  -7.62 4.57 -6.68 3.80 -4.23 2.30 
1,000,000  -2.75 2.12 -2.71 1.92 -2.72 1.80 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 






Percent Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k) Participation 
Assuming Couple Waits until Age 40 to Participate 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending
25,000  -5.22 0.77 -0.69 0.06 0.86 -0.17 
50,000  -4.69 1.12 -2.98 0.73 -0.63 0.13 
100,000  -3.36 1.25 -1.99 0.75 -0.13 0.03 
150,000  -4.89 2.34 -3.68 1.73 -1.63 0.75 
200,000  -5.52 2.88 -4.98 2.51 -3.23 1.57 
250,000  -6.01 3.44 -4.80 2.63 -3.95 2.07 
300,000  -6.00 3.63 -4.68 2.68 -3.81 2.08 
1,000,000  -2.67 2.06 -2.47 1.76 -2.06 1.37 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 
annual taxes and spending on consumption, housing, college tuition, and life insurance premiums.    36
Table 14 
 
Percent Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k) Participation 
Assuming Couple Stops Contributing after Age 49 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending
25,000  -2.35 0.30 -0.10 -0.03 7.83 -1.32 
50,000  -3.03 0.69 1.27 -0.39 5.78 -1.54 
100,000  -5.04 1.90 -2.91 1.10 0.33 -0.14 
150,000  -5.11 2.42 -2.64 1.23 0.23 -0.11 
200,000  -6.61 3.43 -5.17 2.59 -2.54 1.23 
250,000  -7.66 3.83 -6.82 3.32 -4.43 2.04 
300,000  -6.96 4.21 -6.57 3.76 -4.11 2.24 
1,000,000  -3.95 3.05 -3.94 2.80 -4.03 2.67 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 







Percent Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k) Participation 
Assuming Couple’s Real Wages Grow at 2% 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending
25,000  -10.00  0.45 -5.26 0.23 1.33 -0.68 
50,000  -9.05 1.11 -4.50 0.48 1.21 -0.81 
100,000  -10.43  3.81 -6.87 2.57 -3.23 1.13 
150,000  -8.47 4.52 -4.92 2.54 -1.80 0.89 
200,000  -8.75 5.10 -6.86 3.81 -4.15 2.19 
250,000  -8.14 5.12 -7.52 4.49 -5.13 2.91 
300,000  -7.49 4.92 -7.38 4.58 -5.16 3.03 
1,000,000  -3.11 2.50 -3.65 2.72 -4.15 2.89 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 




Percent Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from Participating in a Regular IRA 
Constant Nominal Contribution of $2,000 per Person per Year 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending
25,000  -4.49 0.73 -1.29 0.21 3.64 -0.58 
50,000  -2.08 0.54 -2.96 0.78 -0.62 0.16 
100,000  -1.29 0.49 -1.93 0.74 -2.55 0.96 
150,000  -1.15 0.54 -1.32 0.61 -1.78 0.81 
200,000  -1.15 0.59 -1.62 0.80 -1.72 0.82 
250,000  -1.60 0.90 -1.34 0.72 -1.75 0.91 
300,000  -1.38 0.82 -1.26 0.71 -1.44 0.77 
1,000,000  -0.56 0.43 -0.55 0.39 -0.59 0.39 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 






Percent Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from Participating in a Regular IRA 
Constant Nominal Contribution of $5,000 per Spouse per Year 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending
25,000  2.39  -0.39 15.86 -2.58 29.67 -4.75 
50,000  -3.55 0.92 1.04 -0.27 5.55 -1.44 
100,000  -2.89 1.11 -3.82 1.46 -2.03 0.76 
150,000  -2.17 1.02 -3.04 1.41 -2.58 1.17 
200,000  -2.61 1.34 -3.15 1.56 -3.45 1.65 
250,000  -2.85 1.60 -3.11 1.67 -3.35 1.73 
300,000  -2.91 1.73 -2.69 1.52 -2.89 1.56 
1,000,000  -1.31 1.01 -1.27 0.90 -1.32 0.88 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 
annual taxes and spending on consumption, housing, college tuition, and life insurance premiums.    38
Table 18 
 
Percent Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from Participating in a Roth IRA 
Constant Nominal Contribution of $2,000 per Spouse per Year 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending
25,000  -2.27 0.37 -1.77 0.29 -1.27 0.20 
50,000  -3.20 0.83 -3.21 0.84 -2.38 0.62 
100,000  -1.76 0.68 -2.85 1.09 -2.68 1.00 
150,000  -1.61 0.76 -2.07 0.96 -2.65 1.20 
200,000  -1.27 0.65 -1.78 0.88 -2.18 1.04 
250,000  -1.59 0.89 -1.58 0.85 -1.99 1.03 
300,000  -1.66 0.99 -1.51 0.85 -1.93 1.04 
1,000,000  -0.87 0.67 -0.89 0.63 -0.96 0.63 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 







Percentage Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from Participating in a Roth IRA 
Assuming a Constant Nominal Contribution of $5,000 per Spouse per Year 
 
 Real  Return 
  4 percent  6 percent  8 Percent 
Age-25  Earnings  ($)  Taxes Spending Taxes Spending Taxes Spending
25,000  -2.38 0.38 -1.86 0.30 -1.36 0.22 
50,000  -3.85 1.00 -3.24 0.85 -2.42 0.63 
100,000  -4.22 1.62 -3.79 1.45 -2.75 1.03 
150,000  -3.45 1.63 -4.23 1.96 -2.93 1.32 
200,000  -2.93 1.50 -3.94 1.96 -3.37 1.61 
250,000  -3.00 1.69 -3.31 1.78 -3.67 1.90 
300,000  -3.10 1.84 -3.27 1.85 -3.63 1.95 
1,000,000  -1.88 1.45 -2.02 1.43 -2.20 1.45 
Note: Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value, discounted at 6 percent real, of the couples’ 
annual taxes and spending on consumption, housing, college tuition, and life insurance premiums.    39
 
Appendix 
ESPlanner’s Tax and Social Security Benefit Calculations 
 
Federal Income Tax Calculations 
ESPlanner’s calculations of federal income taxes in each future year take into account the 
household’s year-specific marital status. Thus, in the case of married households, the 
marital status is married when both spouses are alive and single when one is deceased. 
Households that are married are assumed to file jointly. The tax schedules for each filing 
status are taken from the federal income tax booklet for the latest available tax year—
usually the year prior to the “current” year entered by the user. The tax schedule is 
applied to the program’s calculation of federal taxable income. Federal taxable income 
equals federal Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) less personal exemptions and less the 
standard or itemized deduction, whichever is larger.  
 
AGI for each year includes projected incomes in current dollars from the following 
sources: Labor income (wages and salaries), self-employment income, asset income 
projected by the program based on user inputs of initial non-tax-favored net worth and 
rates of return, and on the optimal spending plan computed by the program. AGI also 
includes taxable asset income, taxable social security benefits, taxable special receipts, 
taxable distributions from defined-benefit pension plans and taxable withdrawals from 
tax-favored saving plans. Each of these items is based upon the user’s inputs and 
preferences. Nontaxable special receipts and withdrawals from nondeductible tax-favored 
accounts are not included in AGI. Deductible contributions to tax-favored retirement 
accounts are subtracted from income in calculating each year’s AGI. Employer 
contributions to tax-favored retirement accounts are not included in AGI. However, 
withdrawals from these accounts are included.  
 
The Tax Schedule 
The tax schedules for the two types of filing statuses implemented in ESPlanner are taken 
from the federal income tax booklet for the 1998 tax year—the latest year for which the 
federal schedules are available. These schedules are as follows: 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
If taxable income is 
over-- 
but not over--  the tax is--  of the amount 
over-- 
Married filing jointly: 
$0 $42,350    ----------  15%  $0 
42,350  102,300   $6,352.50 +  28 %  42,350 
102,300 155,950  23,138.50  +  31%  102,300 
155,950 278,450  39,770.00  +  36%  155,950 
278,450 ----------  83,870.00  +  39.6%  278,450 
      40
Single: 
$0 $25,350  ----------  15%   $0 
25,350  61,400   $3,802.50 +  28%  25,350 
61,400  128,100   13,896.50 +  31%  61,400 
128,100  278,450   34,573.50 +  36 %  128,100 
278,450  ----------   88,699.50 +  39.6%  278,450 
 
 
The Indexation of the Tax Schedule  
Tax-rate brackets and inframarginal tax amounts (all of the dollar amounts listed in the 
tax schedules) are adjusted for inflation in each year over the household’s lifetime. This 
is done to ensure that the schedule keeps pace with the growth of income in current 
dollars. The indexation is done using the user-specified rate of inflation.  
 
Adjustment for the current year 
Because the tax schedules listed above are applicable for the 1998 tax year and the user 
will enter 1999 as the current year, all tax brackets and inframarginal tax amounts [the 
dollar amounts shown in column (3) in the schedules listed above] are indexed for 
inflation at the user-specified annual rate. This is done to avoid subjecting 1999 taxable 
income to tax schedules appropriate for 1998—that is, based on the wage and price levels 
prevailing in 1998. 
 
Standard Deductions and Exemptions 
The standard deduction and personal exemption amounts are also taken from the tax year 
prior to the “current” year (tax year 1998 in the current version). The amount subtracted 
from AGI for each personal exemption was $2,700. The standard deductions were $7,100 
for the “married filing jointly” filing status and $4,250 for the “single” filing status. 
These amounts are also indexed for inflation for each future year based on the user-
specified future rate of inflation. The number of personal exemptions allowed equals 2 
plus the number of children for “married and filing jointly” and 1 plus the number of 
children for the “single” filing statuses. The personal exemption amount that can be 
deducted from AGI in calculating taxable income is phased out if AGI is above certain 
dollar limits depending upon the filing status. ESPlanner takes account of the phase-out 
of personal exemptions based on these dollar limits indexed for inflation.  
 
The Decision to Itemize 
ESPlanner takes the maximum of the standard deduction or itemized deduction where the 
latter includes mortgage interest payments, property taxes, state and local income tax 
payments, and tax-deductible special expenditures that the user specifies—such as 
alimony payments, charitable contributions, and deductible medical expenses. Note that 
state and local income tax payments are deductible only if they are being withheld from 
pay or the user makes estimated tax payments during the during the tax year. ESPlanner 
assumes withholding or prepayment in every case. 
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The Phaseout of Itemized Deductions 
Federal income tax rules phase out itemized deductions for high-income taxpayers (both 
married filing jointly and single payers). For the 1998 tax year, the amount of the 
deduction is reduced by 3 cents for every dollar of AGI in excess of $124,500, with the 
total reduction limited to 80 percent of the original amount. The reduction does not apply 
to certain components of the itemized deductions claimed—such as medical care 
expenses, investment interest, and casualty and theft losses. Because ESPlanner does not 
distinguish between these and other sources of itemized deductions, the phaseout rules 
are applied to the entire itemized deduction.  
 
The Child Tax Credit 
The child tax credit equals $400 times the number of qualifying children in the 
household. The tax credit is phased out if AGI is over the threshold of $110,000 for the 
“married and filing jointly” status and of $75,000 for the “single” filing status. The 
phaseout rate is $50 for each $1,000 of income in excess of the applicable threshold. The 
amount of the child tax credit equals the computed amount or the federal income tax 
liability net of the earned income tax credit, whichever is less. If the earned income tax 
credit exceeds the federal income tax liability, the child tax credit is applied against the 
payroll tax liability. 
 
The Earned Income Credit  
The program’s calculation of the earned income credit adheres to the EIC worksheet in 
federal Form 1040. ESPlanner first checks for eligibility to take EIC based on investment 
income and on taxable and nontaxable (employer contributions to 401(k) plans, for 
example) earned income thresholds for households with no qualifying child and those 
with at least one qualifying child (adopted, foster, step- and grandchildren are excluded in 
ESPlanner’s calculations). Next, EIC is computed based on the EIC schedule for taxable 
and nontaxable income. If the EIC is nonzero, it applies if AGI is less than certain dollar 
thresholds ($5,600 for households without a qualifying child and $ 12,300 for households 
with at least one qualifying child). If AGI is greater than these dollar amounts, EIC is 
based on the AGI.  
 
Payroll Taxes 
In each year, the payroll tax for a married household is the sum of the two spouses’ 
payroll taxes. Each spouse’s tax equals the employee share of the OASDI tax rate (6.2 
percent) applied to labor earnings up to the taxable maximum level plus the employee 
share of the HI tax rate (1.45 percent) applied to total labor earnings. If earnings from 
self-employment are present, these are included in the calculation only to the extent that 
labor earnings fall short of the taxable maximum limit for the OASDI tax. The entire 
labor income from self-employment is taxed on account of the HI tax. In the case of self-
employment income, the employer plus employee tax rates for OASDI and HI are 
applied. 
 
The Taxation of Social Security Benefits 
Social Security benefits are taxed by including these benefits in the federal income tax 
base in the following manner. If the sum of AGI and 50 percent of Social Security   42
benefits falls short of $25,000 (adjusted for inflation for future years) if single and 
$32,000 (same qualifier) if married, then none of the benefits are taxable. If the sum 
exceeds the applicable dollar threshold, but the excess is less than $9,000 if single 
($12,000 if married), then the smaller of one-half of the excess or 50 percent of the 
benefit is taxable and is included in the federal income tax base. In addition, if the 
aforementioned excess is greater than the dollar thresholds, 85 percent of this excess or 
85 percent of the benefit, whichever is smaller, is also added to the federal income tax 
base.  
 
State Income Tax Calculations 
State income taxes are calculated for each state that imposes an income tax according to 
the specific tax rules applicable in user’s state of residence. In most cases, the state 
income tax base equals the federal AGI readjusted for taxable Social Security benefits. 
State income tax calculations incorporate special features peculiar to each state: For 
example, some states (such as Massachusetts) impose special taxes on asset incomes. 
State-specific personal, spousal, and dependent exemptions (including additional 
exemptions for the elderly) and the applicable standard deductions are used to calculate 
the state taxable income. State taxes are calculated by applying the state’s tax rate 
schedule to the taxable income.  
 
Social Security Benefit Calculations 
Retirement Benefits  
Eligibility—Before ESPlanner provides you (and your spouse if married) Social Security 
retirement benefits, it checks that you are fully insured. Individuals must be fully insured 
to receive retirement benefits based on their earnings records. Becoming fully insured 
requires sufficient contributions at a job (including self-employment) covered by Social 
Security. For those born after 1929, acquiring 40 credits prior to retirement suffices for 
fully-insured status. To determine credits, earnings between 1937 and 1951 are 
aggregated and divided by $400, and the result (rounded down to an integer number) 
yields the pre-1952 credits which are added to the credits earned after 1950. After 1951, 
workers earn one credit for each quarter of the year they work in Social Security-covered 
employment and earn above a specified minimum amount. The year of first eligibility for 
retirement benefits is the year in which the individual turns 62. The individual is entitled 
to retirement benefits after an application for benefits is submitted, but never before age 
62.  
 
Determination of Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)—The PIA is the basis for all benefit 
payments made on a worker’s earnings record. There are several steps in computing the 
PIA. Base years are computed as the years after 1950 up to the first month in which the 
individual is entitled to retirement benefits. For survivor benefits, base years include the 
year of the worker’s death.  
 
Elapsed years are computed as those years after 1950 (or after attainment of age 21, 
whichever occurs later) up to (but not including) the year of first eligibility. The 
maximum number of elapsed years for an earnings record is 40 (it could be shorter, for 
purposes of calculating survivor benefits, if the person dies prior to age 62).    43
 
Computation years are calculated as the number of elapsed years less 5, or 2, whichever 
is greater. Earnings in base years (up to the maximum taxable limit in each year, and 
through age 60 or two years prior to death, whichever occurs earlier) are wage-indexed 
according to economy-wide average wages. Of these, the highest earnings in years 
equaling the number of computation years are added together and the sum is divided by 
the number of months in computation years to yield Average Indexed Monthly Earnings 
(AIME). 
  
Bend Points—The AIME is converted into a PIA using a formula with bend points. The 
bend point formula is specified as 90 percent of the first X dollars of AIME plus 32 
percent of the next Y dollars of AIME plus 15 percent of the AIME in excess of Y 
dollars. The dollar amounts X and Y are also wage indexed and are different for different 
eligibility years. The dollar amounts pertaining to the year of attaining age 60 (or, for 
survivor benefits, the second year before death, whichever is earlier) are applied in 
computing the PIA. 
 
Benefits—A person who begins to collect benefits at his or her "normal retirement age" 
(currently age 65) receives the PIA as the monthly retirement benefit. In subsequent 
years, the monthly benefit is adjusted according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to 
maintain its purchasing power.  
 
Increases in Normal Retirement Ages—After 2003 normal retirement ages are scheduled 
to increase by 2 months for every year that a person’s 65th birthday occurs later than the 
year 2003. This progressive increase in the normal retirement age for those born later 
ceases between the years 2008 through 2020; those attaining age 65 in these years have a 
normal retirement age of 66. The postponement in retirement ages resumes after 2020 
such that those born after 2025 have a normal retirement age of 67. All cohorts attaining 
age 65 after that year have a normal retirement age of 67. 
  
Reductions for Age—A person who begins to collect retirement benefits earlier than the 
normal retirement age receives a reduction for age. The reduction factor is 5/9 of 1 
percent for each month of entitlement prior to the normal retirement age. The reduced 
benefit payment (except for the inflation adjustment) continues even after the person 
reaches or surpasses the normal retirement age. If the number of months of reduction 
exceeds 36 months (for example, in case of entitlement at age 62 when the normal 
retirement age is 67), then the reduction factor is 5/12 of 1 percent for every additional 
month of early entitlement. 
  
Delayed Retirement Credits—Those who begin to collect benefits after their normal 
retirement age (up to age 70) receive delayed retirement credits. The amount of the 
delayed retirement credit for each month of delayed entitlement depends on the year in 
which a person attains normal retirement age. For example, those attaining age 65 in 
1997 receive an additional 5 percent in monthly benefits for each year of delay in 
entitlement. However, those attaining age 65 in the year 2008 will receive an additional 8 
percent in benefits for each year of delayed entitlement.    44
  
Earnings Test—If a person continues to work and earn after the month of entitlement, 
benefits are reduced because of an earnings test. Beneficiaries under the normal 
retirement age lose $1 for each $2 earned above an earnings limit. Those older than the 
normal retirement age lose $1 for each $3 earned above a higher earnings limit. The 
earnings limits have already been specified through 2000 and are scheduled to grow with 
average wages in subsequent years. All benefits payable on a worker’s earnings record, 
including the worker’s own retirement benefits and spousal and child dependent benefits, 
are proportionally reduced by the testing of the worker’s earnings.  
  
Recomputation of Benefits—Earnings in any year after entitlement are automatically 
taken into account in a recomputation of the PIA for determining the subsequent year’s 
benefit amount. However, these earnings are not indexed before they are included in the 
AIME calculation. If such earnings are higher than some prior year’s earnings (indexed 
earnings through age 60 or unindexed earnings after age 60), they result in an increase in 
the PIA and benefit payable. If they are lower than all previous years’ earnings, they will 
not lower the PIA or benefits since only the highest earnings in base years are included in 
the calculations. 
 
Spousal and Child Dependent Benefits 
Eligibility—Wives and husbands of insured workers (including divorced spouses) are 
entitled to spousal benefits if the couple has been married for at least 10 years at the time 
of application for spousal benefits, the spouse is older than 62 or is caring for a child 
under age 16 who is entitled to benefits under the insured worker’s record, and the 
insured worker is collecting retirement benefits. Children of insured workers under age 
16 are entitled to child dependent benefits if the child is unmarried and the worker is 
collecting retirement benefits. 
 
Benefits—Spousal and child benefits equal 50 percent of the insured worker’s PIA 
(each). Child dependent benefits may be lower only if the family maximum applies. 
Spousal benefits may be lower due to the family maximum, a reduction for age, the 
application of the earnings test, or the spouse’s receipt of retirement benefits based or her 
or his own earnings record. 
 
Family Maximum—All benefits paid under a worker’s record (except retirement benefits 
or divorced spousal benefits) are reduced proportionately to bring them within the family 
maximum benefit level. The maximum benefits payable on a worker’s earnings record is 
determined by applying a bend-point formula to the PIA similar to that applied to the 
AIME in calculating the PIA. For example, the family maximum equals 150 percent of 
the first $X of PIA plus 272 percent of the next $Y of the PIA plus 134 percent of the 
next $Z of the PIA plus 175 percent of the PIA greater than $X+$Y+$Z. The values X, 
Y, and Z are adjusted for each year of the calculation according to the growth in 
economy-wide average wages. In case the spousal benefit is eliminated for any reason, 
the benefits payable on the insured worker’s record are subjected to the family maximum 
test again, treating the spouse as though he or she were not eligible for spousal benefits.   45
This may result in higher benefits for children who may be eligible for dependent benefits 
under the worker’s record. 
 
Reduction of Spousal Benefits for Age—Spouses eligible for the spousal benefit may elect 
to receive (may become entitled to) their benefits before normal retirement age. In this 
case, the spousal benefit is reduced by 25/36 of 1 percent for each month of entitlement 
prior to normal retirement age. If the number of months of reduction exceeds 36 months 
(for example, in case of entitlement at age 62 when the normal retirement age is 67), then 
the reduction factor is 5/12 of 1 percent for every additional month of early entitlement. 
 
Earnings Testing and Redefinition of Spousal Benefits—If a spouse is earning above the 
amount allowed by the earnings test, the spousal benefits he or she is eligible to receive 
will be earnings tested according to the pre- and post-normal retirement schedule 
described above. If a spouse is already collecting retirement benefits, the spousal benefit 
is redefined as the greater of the excess of the spousal benefit over the spouse’s own 
retirement benefit or zero. 
 
Survivor Benefits (Widow(er), Father/Mother, and Children) 
Eligibility—The surviving spouse of a deceased worker is eligible for widow(er) benefits 
if the widow(er) is at least 60 and is entitled (has applied for widow[er] benefits), the 
worker died fully insured, and the widow(er) was married to the deceased worker for at 
least 9 months. The widow(er) of a deceased worker is eligible for father/mother benefits 
if the widow(er) is entitled to benefits (has applied), the worker died fully insured, and 
the widower is caring for a child of the worker. A surviving child is eligible for child 
survivor benefits on the deceased worker’s record if the child is under 18 and is entitled 
(an application has been filed) and the worker was fully insured.  
 
Survivor Benefits—Monthly benefits equal 100 percent of the worker’s PIA for a 
widow(er); they equal 75 percent of the PIA for father/mother and child survivor benefits. 
Widow(er) and child survivor benefits may be lower only if the family maximum applies. 
Widow(er)s may become entitled to (elect to receive) survivor benefits earlier than 
normal retirement age, but not earlier than age 60. In this case, the reduction is 19/40 of 1 
percent for each month of entitlement prior to normal retirement age. After the widow(er) 
is 62, he or she may become entitled to (elect to receive) retirement benefits based on his 
or her own past covered-earnings record. In this case, the widow(er) benefits are 
redefined as the excess over the worker’s own retirement benefit or zero, whichever is 
greater. Finally, widow(er) survivor and the worker’s own retirement benefits are also 
subject to the earnings test. If the deceased worker was already collecting a reduced 
retirement insurance benefit, the widow(er)’s benefit cannot be greater than the reduced 
widow(er) benefit or the greater of 82.5 percent of the worker’s PIA or the worker’s own 
retirement benefit. If the deceased worker was already collecting a retirement insurance 
benefit greater than the PIA because of delayed retirement, the widow(er) is granted the 
full dollar amount of the delayed retirement credit over and above the (reduced) 
widow(er) benefit. Father/mother benefits are not similarly augmented by delayed 
retirement credits that the deceased worker may have been receiving. 
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Father/Mother Benefits—These benefits may be reduced if the family maximum applies 
or if the father or mother is entitled to the his or her own retirement benefit. In this case, 
the father/mother benefit is redefined as the excess over the father or mother’s own 
retirement benefit or zero, whichever is greater. Father/mother benefits are also subject to 
the earnings test. On the other hand, they are not reduced for age. For those eligible to 
receive both widow(er) and father/mother benefits, the program calculates both and takes 
the larger benefit.  
  
Calculation of a Deceased Worker’s PIA—The calculation of survivor benefits in the 
case of widow(er) benefits uses the larger of two alternative calculations of the deceased 
worker’s PIA. These are the “wage indexing” method and the “re-indexing” method. 
Moreover, the years up to which the worker’s wages are indexed may be different, 
depending upon whether the deceased worker would have turned 62 before or after the 
widow(er) turned 60.  
 
The wage-indexing method—the last year for indexing earnings is the earlier of a) the 
year the worker dies minus 2 years or b) the year worker would have turned 60. Bend-
point-formula dollar amounts are taken from the year the worker dies or the year the 
worker would have turned 62, whichever is earlier. The PIA thus calculated is inflated by 
the CPI up to the year the widow(er) turns 60 (if later) to obtain the PIA value on which 
widower benefits would be based. Where applicable, these benefits are then adjusted for 
the family maximum, reduction for age, delayed retirement credits, and the earnings test. 
 
The reindexing method—The worker’s original earnings are indexed up to the year the 
widow(er) turns 58 orthe year the worker turns 60, whichever is earlier. The elapsed 
years are computed as the number of years from 1951 (or the from the year the worker 
turned 22, if later) through the year the widow(er) turns 60. The computation years equal 
elapsed years minus 5 years (computation years cannot be less than 2). Bend-point-
formula dollar values are applied from the year the widow(er) reaches 60. There is no 
subsequent indexing of the PIA for inflation. 
 
The Sequencing of Widow(er) Benefit Calculations—Widow(er) benefit reductions 
follow these steps: First the widow(er) plus children’s benefits are subjected to the family 
maximum. Second, the widow(er) benefit is reduced for early entitlement (of the 
widow(er) prior to normal retirement age). Third, the widow(er) benefit is compared to 
the widow(er)’s own retirement benefit if he or she is entitled to the latter. Fourth, the 
widow(er) benefit is redefined as the excess over the worker’s own benefit if worker’s 
own benefit is positive. Finally the earnings test is applied, first to the widow(er)’s own 
benefit and then to the widow(er) benefit that is in excess of the worker’s own benefit. If 
the widow(er) benefit is eliminated as a result of these tests, the benefits payable on the 
insured worker’s record are subjected to the family maximum test again, treating the 
widow(er) as though he or she were not eligible for the widow(er) benefit. This procedure 
can potentially increase children’s benefits if the family maximum limit was binding the 
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